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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Many scholars have investigated the bidders’ behavior in online auctions, including online bidding strategies. Usually they 
used archival bidding data retrieved from the auction servers to analyze the behavior of the bidders. The information hidden 
inside the archival data, such as the bidding timing, bidding times, starting price, bid increment, and final price, etc., is 
objective and several bidding strategies were identified from those data. For example, ratchet bidding is identified when some 
bidders increase the current bid by the minimal bid increment [3] while jump bidding when some bidders bid in excess of the 
minimal necessary increment [5]. Early bidding is found when some bidders bid at the early time of an auction [1] while snipe 
bidding or late bidding when some bidders bid just before the auction’s end [2, 4]. Using a software bidding agent to bid is a 
strategy called agent bidding [7]. These findings from objective archival data have laid the foundation to the research on online 
bidding strategies. 
 
However, online bidding is like game playing with some psychological elements involved in, which cannot be easily obtained 
by the objective data. For example, the objective data may show that some bidder’s first entry time is late, indicating a snipe 
bidding strategy was performed near the end of the auction, while he/she actually is using ratchet bidding strategy only at the 
late stage of an auction. Therefore, this study attempts to investigate online bidding strategies from another perspective. Instead 
of using objective archival data, this study tries to collect and analyze subjective data through a survey on the proxies of online 
bidding strategies. We believe that the subjective data can eliminate some biased information and reveal the actual bidding 
strategies used the bidders, which can help researchers to better understand online bidders’ bidding behavior. 
 
A survey was then conducted among the online bidders in Taobao.com because it is the biggest online auction website in China 
and it owns the most Chinese bidders. In the survey, questions on bidders’ perceptions of their bidding frequency, agent 
bidding frequency, bidding entry time and bid increment were developed and asked in the questionnaire, as the proxies of 
online bidding strategies. The subjective data were automatically recorded by the online survey. 
 
In order to identify the bidding strategies used by the bidders, this study adopted a two-step cluster analysis method [6]. Based 
on the four proxies: perceived bidding frequency, perceived agent bidding frequency, perceived bidding entry, and perceived 
bid increment, we ran the first step. The hierarchical cluster analysis suggested a three-cluster solution. Then we indicated  
three clusters in the second step of K-mean cluster analysis on the four proxies to identify the details. The results revealed that 
Cluster 1 has the lowest perceived bid increment and use frequency of agent software; this indicates that these bidders bid 
manually and as low as possible, suggesting that they opt for ratchet bidding. Cluster 2 has an extremely high perceived agent 
bidding frequency and bid increment, suggesting that these bidders typically set a very high reservation price to the bidding 
agent and allow the latter to conduct the bidding for them. It was named as agent jump bidding because it has characteristics of 
both agent and jump bidding. Meanwhile, Cluster 3 is characterized by perceived late bidding as well as perceived low bidding 
frequency and bid increment, indicating the bidders perceive themselves enter auctions very late and place very few bids in the 
auction process. They are identified as snipe bidding strategy. 
 
The three bidding strategies identified in this study, i.e., ratcheting bidding, agent jump bidding and snipe bidding, confirm the 
research findings in previous research. The reason why agent and jump bidding are combined to one cluster may be due to the 
special bidding mechanism of Taobao. Whenever you perform a jump bidding and raise the bid by a mount higher than the 
minimum bid increment, the bidding agent of Taobao will be automatically triggered and it just becomes an agent bidding, 
which generates the hybrid auction mechanism. In addition, early bidding was not identified in this study although it was found 
when some researchers analyzed objective archival data [1]. One reason is that Taobao auctions do not have time priority as 
Yankee auctions do. It is not necessary for bidders to enter the auctions early to get the priority for a tie. The second reason  
may lie in the characteristics of early bidding itself. Early bidding has been found less effective [1] and satisfactory [4] than 
other bidding strategies. People may have learned it during years of experience and then choose not to bid too early. As least 
from the perspective of bidders themselves, most of them believe their entry time is not early. 
 
The research findings can help the researchers and practitioners in this line to understand better the bidding behavior of online 
bidders. It can also help the auction website owners to design their auctions in a more effective way. For example, they can 
provide options whether starting bidding agent or not when some bidders perform jump bidding strategy instead of triggering it 
directly. Some bidders would like to use jump bidding with a huge increase of the bid to show their determination of winning 
the auction to others. The automation of bidding agent originally designed in Taobao probably lessens the intimidating effect 
with only a small amount increased. Another insight from this study is that sellers can shorten the duration of their auctions a 
bit to increase the efficiency since bidders are not active in the early stage. 
 
This study tries to collect and analyze the subjective data from a survey to identify the online bidding strategies. The research 
results  confirm  most  of  the  bidding  strategies  in  previous  studies,  indicating  the  validation  of  this  method.  Moreover, 
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subjective-data-analysis is supplementary to objective-data-analysis by including more psychological elements that the latter 
cannot capture easily. More subjective data should be applied in online bidding behavior studies because bidding is a process 
involving mental activities. For example, some bidder may first use bidding strategy A while drop it half way and switch to 
bidding strategy B. The actual information of such a bidding process can be more easily obtained from an interview or survey, 
rather than archival data. In addition, more subjective data can be collected from other auction websites other than Taobao to 
generalize the research findings. 
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